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FOR RELEASE 10:00 A.M., EST MONDAY, DECEMBER 11, 1972

STATEMENT OF THE
AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS
ON
ESTIMATES, FORECASTS AND PROJECTIONS OF
ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE
BEFORE THE
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION

INTRODUCTION
I am Wallace E. Olson, Executive Vice President of
the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants.

The

Institute is the national professional association of certified
public accountants.

It is composed of more than 88,000 members,

residing in every state of the Union.
With me today are LeRoy Layton, President of the
American Institute, and Douglas R. Carmichael, Director of the
Institute’s Technical Research Division.

The American Institute

fills a distinct and important role in our economic system by
setting the standards which must be adhered to by Institute
members in their independent examinations of financial statements.
The Institute’s Board of Directors has authorized
me to present views today even though the Institute’s senior
technical committees have not yet reached definitive conclusions
on the subject of forecasting.

Accordingly, I would not wish

any of my remarks today, or any remarks previously given in these
proceedings by representatives of the Institute, to indicate
that final positions relating to forecasts have been reached on
behalf of the Institute.

In addition, it should not be implied
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that all Institute members necessarily agree with the views which
I will present.

Some CPA firms have already appeared before

these hearings to express their opinions.
QUESTIONS TO BE DISCUSSED
Our comments will address what we believe to be the
two most fundamental questions concerning publication of forecasts
of economic performance:
1.

Whether forecasts should be required, merely
permitted, or prohibited in whole or in part
in filings with the Commission?

2.

If forecasts are permitted or required, what
precautions and standards are necessary for
the protection of investors?

In addressing those questions, we will discuss the
following related matters:

(1) the definition of forecasts,

(2) forecasting methods and practices, (3) the accuracy of
forecasts, (4) current forecast publication practices, (5) the
benefits of publication, (6) the dangers of publication, (7) the
problem of liability, (8) our recommendations on publication,
and (9) our recommendations on safeguards.
Following the discussion of these matters we will
comment briefly on the remainder of the seven specific issues
mentioned in the Commission’s notice of hearing.
DEFINITIONS OF FORECASTS
Although the Commission has used the terms "estimates,
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forecasts and projections of economic performance” we shall use
the single term "forecasts” in our comments solely for the sake
of brevity.
The term "forecasts” is frequently applied to data
which may vary greatly in format, extent of detail and purpose.
For this reason, a careful definition of what constitutes a
"forecast” is an important first requirement if the Commission
is to relax its present prohibition against public disclosure
of forecasts.
While we do not intend to suggest a precise definition
it is necessary, for purposes of clarity, to stress the following:
1,

Our comments are not directed to the type of
forecasts which are intended purely for manage
ment purposes and may be deliberately overstated
as goals for corporate personnel.

Such forecasts

are commonly referred to as budgets.
2.

Forecasts of economic performance include both
profit forecasts and cash flow forecasts which
are integrally related.

A forecast of cash

receipts and disbursements is inevitably based
on a forecast of profits.
3.

For purposes of our discussion, we intend the
term "forecasts” to mean financial summaries of
the best possible estimates of future expecta
tions.
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FORECASTINC METHODS AND PRACTICE
A study for the Financial Executives Institute con
ducted by A. T. Kearney & Company, Inc. showed that all of the
338 companies that responded to the survey prepare forecasts
for their internal use.

Over 97 per cent of the responding

companies prepare corporate earnings, sales, and expense
forecasts.

The study did not disclose the precise methods used

in preparing forecasts.
In general, however, a forecast begins with past
experience as a base, but management must then consider the
factors which will affect the economy and their industry in
general and their business in particular in the future.
of such factors are:

Examples

(1) economic indicators and trends, (2)

market surveys, (3) engineering studies of future costs and
levels

of production, (4) labor relations, (5) possible

legislation and (6) the financial resources required and the
means of generating these resources.

Management must project

revenue (volume, price and inflation), level of production,
capital expenditures, and related costs and activities.

These

projections must then be translated into financial statement form.
The forecasting process is basically an art and is
a multidisciplinary undertaking.

No standards exist for the

process itself or for the format of a completed forecast.

An

essential ingredient of a forecast is an in-depth knowledge of
the company and the markets in which it competes.

Because of

the diversity of factors to be considered, forecasting will
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never achieve precision and it is unlikely that generally
accepted methods will evolve in the foreseeable future.
ACCURACY OF FORECASTS
Several studies of the accuracy of forecasts have
been made.

The study conducted for the FEI by A. T. Kearney

& Company, Inc. showed that corporate earnings variance in
excess of 20 per cent was typical for 13 per cent of the
companies surveyed and almost one quarter of the companies
have results that typically differ from the forecast by more
than 10 per cent.

On the other hand, over 90 per cent of the

companies had a variance within plus or minus 10 per cent for
corporate sales.

Other studies have shown that revenues can

be forecasted with reasonably accurate results, but substantially
less accuracy is possible for forecasting earnings.
A study of the accuracy of profit forecasts in bid
situations in the United Kingdom by C. A. Westwick of the
English Institute of Chartered Accountants showed slightly
better results.

Of 210 forecasts, 170 (8l per cent) were

met within a margin of plus or minus 10 per cent.

This study

showed that the accuracy of forecasts increases the nearer
they are made to the end of the year to which they relate and
that generally forecasts that extend too far into the future
are less reliable than short-term forecasts.
The accuracy of a forecast is dependent largely
on the quality of the underlying assumptions.

Some assumptions
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which result in such amounts as estimated sales and related
costs depend upon the economics of the business.

Supply and

demand factors play an important role in the reasonableness
and potential accuracy of these assumptions.
Other assumptions might be described as contingencies.
The outcome must be assumed one way or another because no
means exist for determining it otherwise.

Some contingencies may

affect only the company, such as strikes, litigation and natural
catastrophies.

Other contingencies may affect the country or

an industry as a whole, such as tax rates, foreign exchange
rates and regulations, and government regulatory action.

No

objective methods exist for determining assumptions of this
type; they must simply be chosen —

one way or another.

It is

the actual outcome o f assumptions of this type that cause the
most dramatic fluctuations between forecasts and results.
Because of the nature of contingency assumptions
and the inherent difficulties in predicting the econonics
of a business, the accuracy of forecasts over the whole
spectrum of business is likely to fall far short of acceptable
limits.

No amount of development of methods will ever fully

overcome this fundamental problem of accuracy of forecasts.
Also, disclosure of assumptions is not a cure for lack of
accuracy since it serves merely to provide information on
the nature of the assumptions made and to draw the attention
of investors to the particular risks to which a business
is most prone.
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We have used the term accuracy in connection with
our discussion of forecasts to denote the degree to which
actual results fall within acceptable tolerance limits of
a forecast.

Sometimes the term reliability is also used

for this purpose.

Regardless of the terminology used, it

is important to note that both the soundness of forecasting
methods and the quality of underlying assumptions have a
significant bearing on the degree of variance of actual
from forecasted results.
CURRENT FORECAST PUBLICATION PRACTICE
Publication of earnings projections is not uncommon.
Companies sometimes release forecasts to financial analysts
and others.

Also, analysts prepare and disseminate forecasts

and some companies will comment on the quality of an analysts
forecast.
When a company’s own projection differs substantially
from one published by an analyst, half the respondents to
the FEI study indicated that they inform the analyst of the
difference.

In addition, some analysts review their projections

with the company’s chief financial executive prior to publica
tion.

Most companies in the FEI study stated that they tell

the analyst if he is beyond the range of reasonableness.
Over 50 per cent of the companies release projections to
analysts in individual interviews or at analyst society
meetings.

Only 12 per cent of the companies release forecasts

in general communications media.
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A study for the National Association of Accountants
completed in 1970 by Morton Backer showed that a substantial
majority (72.8% ) of the 70 companies surveyed disclose profit
projections either publicly, or privately to analysts.
Approximately a third of the companies (32.8% ) disclose
projections in press releases, speeches to analysts, or
other public communication media.

Another 40% of the

companies do not publicize earnings, but will comment on
the reasonableness of an analyst’s projection.
Our own study of projection disclosure in the
annual reports of the 600 companies included in our annual
survey, Accounting Trends and Techniques, showed that only
four companies disclose quantified projections.

Another 234

companies include qualitative statements about future
prospects.

Normally, those disclosures appear in the

president’s letter.
Thus, a substantial amount of disclosure of earnings
projections exists, but the information is not widely
disseminated.
BENEFITS OF PUBLICATION
Two primary benefits and several subsidiary benefits
might be expected from the publication of forecasts.

First,

general publication could eliminate the possibly prejudicial
practice of releasing earnings projections to analysts
without simultaneous release to stockholders.
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Second, publication Of forecasts would provide
additional information for investment decisions.

How

investment decisions are made is not known with certainty,
but it seems logical that they involve an appraisal of a
company’s future prospects.

Consequently, an earnings

projection would be relevant information.

Management

possesses far more data and knowledge than analysts about
the company’s future prospects and should, therefore, be
able to prepare better forecasts.
The possible subsidiary benefits are:

(1) those

companies without adequate forecasting systems would tend
to establish them, (2) the information would also be
available to government and to economists for planning,
(3) the attendant disclosure of assumptions would be more
valuable to investors than forecasts made by various
investment advisors disseminated without explanation
and (4) the availability of forecasts might reduce the
need for the ever growing volume of supplemental disclosures,
such as expense itemization and order backlog, designed to
facilitate prediction of future earnings.
DANGERS OF PUBLICATION
The impact of the public availability of forecasts
on the economy, and particularly the investment community,
is an unknown of major consequence.

Therefore, many dangers

associated with publication of forecasts have quite correctly

-10-

been brought to the Commission’s attention.

We shall

consider only the major dangers without intentionally
discounting the others.
A major danger is that the investing public
will place undue reliance on forecasts if they are published
in annual reports and included in filings with the Commission.
Investors may not recognize the inherent unreliability of
a forecast.

They may attribute the reliability of historical

data to forecasts —

a totally unwarranted attribution.

If public expectations exceed the feasible level
of accuracy of forecasts, the investing public and all
those associated with the publication of financial data —
management, directors, accountants, and underwriters —
suffer.

may

The consequences are costly litigation, diminished

credibility, and a general loss of investor confidence.
In summary, if published forecasts are permitted,
they will become simuntaneously highly important and the
least reliable information available.

A forecast is easy

prey for unintentional bias, for overenthusiasm and,
indeed, for deliberate attempts to mislead.
argument is not one-sided.

Thus the

Both the benefits and the

dangers are considerable.
THE PROBLEM OF LIABILITY
The responsibilities imposed on management, directors,
experts and underwriters for the accuracy of historical infor
mation under Federal securities law are already severe.
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Imposition of similar responsibilities for forecasts would be
unreasonable in view of the inherent inaccuracy of forecasts.
The exposure to liability with respect to forecasts
which may arise under Federal securities law is a grave concern.
At first blush, the impact of potential liability under the
’33 Act appears to present the most immediate and visible
peril.

Section 11 of that Act, as the Commission well knows,

shifts the burden of proof of diligence to all defendants in
a registered public offering save the issuer, rather than leaving
it to the plaintiff to make out negligence, and deprives the
issuer itself of any such defense.
However, the potential for liability under the '34
Act could ultimately prove even more serious.
the '33 Act can always —

or nearly always —

Liability under
be avoided by

prudent and conservative understatement, but under the ’34 Act
even these responsible measures —
Britain —

presently employed in

can lead to claims of damages by frustrated sellers

of securities.

The potential for such whipsaw is especially

serious where the representation involved consists of projected
earnings per share.
Another serious problem concerns the potential for
liability in respect of forecasts gone sour which are not
promptly updated.

On this score, the issuer will almost daily

from the time a forecast is issued be receiving indications
that actual experience is at variance with projected assumptions.
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It may well be necessary to impose some limitations on the
frequency of updating in light of such indications if the public
is not to be deluged with information it cannot digest.

It

seems to us to be most unrealistic to require supplementary
disclosure in respect of forecasts until management has
thoroughly digested and evaluated the supplemental indications.
However it is limited and refined —
—

and we think it should be

we think that whatever responsibility remains in respect

of updating should rest entirely with management.

No one else

will have sufficient information to do it; and any attempt
to update or sound an alarm on less than all available knowledge
and information will only confuse the public.
The potential for liability and litigation is significant
because a forecast is particuarly susceptible to being misunder
stood by the investing public.

Whether undue liability will be

established by litigation will depend heavily on the application
to forecasts of certain terms used in the ’33 and ’34 Acts.
For example, will representations contained in forecasts be
interpreted as "material facts” for purposes of the liability
provisions of the securities statutes?
An equally important question concerns the manner in
which responsibility will be assessed when a forecast is not
borne out by actual events.

Forecasts will very likely fall

wide of the mark without there being justifying imposition of
liability on anyone.
—

The degree to which a forecast is missed

no matter by how much —

will often very likely rest on
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matters outside the issuer’s or anyone’s control. For example,
an assumption might be that labor availability will not be
disrupted by a strike.

If a wildcat strike in an industry with

a history of labor tranquility caused the forecast to be missed,
however substantial the margin, it would be clearly inequitable
if a cause of action were found.
These are serious problems which deserve careful
consideration.

If there is to be experimentation with the

public disclosure of forecasts, we respectfully submit that
as an essential prerequisite the Commission must do two things:
First, it must use its regulatory powers to define the term
"material fact” as it appears in the liability provisions of
the federal securities statutes and related regulations, so
as to exclude from that term at the very least the estimates
and assumptions contained in forecasts.

Second, until much

more i s known about forecasting, the Commission should take
the position, whether by regulation or interpretive release,
that liability for forecasts should be limited to instances of
recklessness or bad faith.

This formulation would require the

makers of a forecast to consider their basis for doing so.
Any standard of liability otherwise framed would leave the
makers of a forecast so concerned for their own potential peril
they would be unlikely to come up with anything useful to the
public.
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RECOMMENDATIONS ON PUBLICATION
The "publication” decision is both extremely important
and complex.

Many imponderables must be weighed, and value

judgments made.

The apparent alternatives are:

(1) prohibit

any dissemination of forecasts and improve the controls over
communications to financial advisors, (2) permit disclosure of
forecasts at a company's discretion, and (3) make disclosure
of forecasts mandatory.
We believe that at the present time there is far
too little knowledge about what the results may be of publication
of forecasts on either a permissive or mandatory basis.

However,

the possible benefits of publication, which we have previously
enumerated, pursuade us to believe that permissive publication
for a trial period of time would be desirable.
In our view, the following program should be adopted
in connection with a trial period of permissive publication
of forecasts:
1.

Guidelines to be followed in connection with
publication of forecasts would have to be
established by the Commission.

Such guidelines

should deal with:
a.

Methods of publication and distribution.

b.

The formats and degree of detail which
will be permitted.

c.

Whether publication, once commenced, must
be continued at regular intervals.

-15-

d.

The circumstances under which updating
will be required and the methods thereof.

e.

Whether a third-party review will be
required and whether publication of a
report on the review will also be mandatory.

2.

When guidelines have been established on the fore
going matters, a trial period of permissive publi
cation of forecasts could begin.

3.

After a reasonable period of experience, the
Commission would be in a position to reach a better
informed decision as to whether to prohibit, permit
or require the inclusion of forecasts in filings
with the Commission.

4.

Assuming that the decision was to either continue
permissive publication or to make it mandatory,
the next step would be to refine the guidelines on
matters previously mentioned.

5.

The final step in the process would be to implement
the decision.

Although we are not prepared to recommend what all of
the guidelines should be, we have concluded that:
1.

Once a company began to disclose forecasts in
filings, it should thereafter be required to con
tinue disclosure unless prohibition was reinstated
or the company could demonstrate sound reasons
for discontinuance.
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2.

Any permission to publish forecasts should be
accompanied

by a requirement of an accompanying

report on a review by a third party.

We shall

comment further on this in a few minutes.
In summary, we believe that after establishing suitable
guidelines, the Commission should permit publication of forecasts
for a trial period during which time it could encourage companies
to disclose forecasts.

This should provide the experience

necessary to form a sound basis for reaching a decision as to
whether prohibition or permissive or mandatory publication
would best serve the public interest in the long run.
RECOMMENDATIONS ON PRECAUTIONS
As many precautions as possible should be adopted to
reduce the dangers of unwarranted reliance by investors, the
potential for abuse, and unjustifiable litigation.
The problem of unwarranted reliance may be alleviated
by care in format requirements.

The format of a forecast should

be as clearly distinguishable as possible from that of historical
financial statements and should convey the basic uncertainty
of a forecast.

One means of communicating forecast uncertainty

is presentation of the data in ranges rather than in single
figures.

However, range presentation might have the reverse

effect if it unduly increased expectations that forecasts would
fall within the range.
Other format suggestions which have been mentioned by
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some, consist of avoidance of side-by-side presentation of
forecasts and historical data or arranging data in a narrative
rather than financial statement form.

We doubt that such

precautions would, in practice, be realistic.
Perhaps the most important precaution against
unreliable forecasts would be a review by a third party.
alternatives regarding this possibility are:

The

(1) no review,

(2) review and publication of a report by the third party,
and (3) review with limited dissemination of a report, such
as restricting it to the company’s board of directors.
As previously indicated, we believe that publication
of forecasts should be accompanied by a third party review
and report thereon.

There is simply too much potential for

abuse in the publication of forecasts to allow their circulation
without a third-party review.

Investors should not be required

to accept forecasts on the premise that the issuers have not
acted recklessly or in bad faith.
If the Commission decides to permit or require dis
closure of forecasts and concludes that third party reviews
and reports are necessary, we think that CPAs would be a
logical group to perform this function.

Accordingly, we would

like to comment on the various factors which must be taken
into account if CPAs are to be involved.
Because forecasts are based largely on considered
guesses about the future, it is not possible for a CPA or any
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other third-party expert, whatever his field or competence,
to vouch for their achievability or reliability.

Neither can

a third party express an objective opinion about the reason
ableness of assumptions since many of the assumptions are
simply predictions for which there are no available means
of objective verification.

To express purely subjective

opinions about management’s assumptions would not seem to
provide any reasonable assurance to investors and could under
some circumstances be contrary to their best interests.
Despite these substantial limitations, a review
by an independent CPA would serve as a useful precaution
since there are several functions that could be performed.
They are as follows:
1.

The mathematics and mechancial accuracy of
compilation

of the forecasts could be

verified.
2.

The conformity of the forecasts with generally
accepted accounting principles could be
verified.

3.

The methods and procedures followed in develop
ing the forecast could be reviewed to determine
whether they conformed with established norms.
Since standards do not presently exist in
this area, they would have to be developed
before this function could be carried out.
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4.

The forecast could be reviewed on an over
all basis to form a judgment as to whether it
clearly had been prepared recklessly or in
bad faith.

However, it would not be possible

to give positive assurance that this was not
the case.
The content and wording of a CPA’s report on his
review of a forecast would pose a difficult problem of how to
communicate to investors the exact nature of his representations.
Great care would have to be exercised to avoid conveying to
investors an impression of greater credibility than would be
warranted.

The Institute’s Auditing Standards Division is

currently studying this matter.
A concern has been expressed by some that a CPA’s
independence would be impaired with respect to historical
financial statements if he were also to report on a review of
forecasts.

Serving in a dual role would certainly pose some

possibility of conflict but no more so than those now faced
in auditing historical financial statements or in other areas
of practice.

Powerful counter-balancing forces exist which

make it imperative for CPAs to withstand the pressures of
possible conflicts to survive in practice.

We believe that

the crucial test of independence is not the nature of the service
being rendered but the nature of the relationship between a CPA
and his client.

For these reasons we do not feel that reporting
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on a review of forecasts would place any undue strain on a
CPA’s objectivity with respect to historical financial state
ments.
In summary of our views on the need for precautions,
we feel that if publication of forecasts is permitted or made
mandatory every reasonable precaution ought to be taken to
avoid their misuse by issuers.

The most effective precaution

would be the requirement of a third party review and report
to be published with each forecast included in filings with
the Commission.

We believe that CPAs could perform this function

within specified limits assuming that the necessary guidelines
and standards would be established.
SUMMARY
In closing we would like to summarize our comments by
briefly indicating our responses to each of the considerations
proposed by the Commission.
1.

Whether such estimates, forecasts or projections
should be required, merely permitted, or prohibited
in whole or in part in filings with the Commission
or whether any requirements should apply only to
certain classes of issues.

We feel that mandatory

publication is not feasible or desirable at this
time.

A trial period of permissive publication

would provide the necessary experience to reach
an informed decision on the desirability of publi
cation.

Necessary guidelines should be established
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before starting such a trial period.

Experience

with the reliability of forecasts might lead to
different requirements for various classes of
issuers.

No doubts certain classes of issuers

or industries would have extreme difficulty with
preparing reliable forecasts.
2.

Which types of filings under the Securities Act
of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
should be allowed, or be required, to contain
such estimates, forecasts or projections, if any,
and whether follow-up reporting should be required.
If and when forecasts are permitted or required or
their inclusion in annual filings would be desirable.
Quarterly reporting to update forecasts might also
be necessary.

3.

Whether guidelines or rules should be adopted
relating to estimates, forecasts or projections
which are disseminated to the public through
the communications media by companies whose securities
are publicly traded.

We believe that new rules

should be adopted to regulate the present practice
of disclosure of forecasts in communications media
and to achieve more equitable dissemination of such
information.
4.

Whether standard assumptions underlying such
estimates, forecasts or projections are feasible.
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and if so, what types of assumptions are
necessary.

We believe that certain types of

assumptions would be common to most forecasts
while others would be unique to a business or
industry.

We feel it would be undesirable to

specify or require any rigid categories of
assumptions until more experience was available
through a trial period of permissive publication.
5.

What format for presentation should be required.
Forecasts should be as clearly distinguishable
as possible from historical financial data.
Other than this stipulation and the obvious need
for adequate disclosure of underlying assumptions,
we feel that wide flexibility in format should
be allowed, at least during a trial period.

6.

Whether certification or some other form of inde
pendent verification or report on such estimates,
forecasts or projections should be required, and if
so, in what form and whether standards for quali
fication of persons certifying, verifying or
reporting on such estimates should be adopted.

We

believe that a third party review of forecasts
prior to publication is necessary.

An independent

certified public accountant could perform such a
review and report on a forecast, but he could not
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express an opinion on the achievability of the
forecast or the reasonableness of the underlying
assumptions.
7.

The effect of the civil and criminal liability
provisions of the Securities Act of 1933 and the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 on estimates,
forecasts or projections filed with the Commission
If publication of forecasts in filings with the
Commission is ever to be a reality, substantial
clarification of the liability of issuers and
experts for forecasts is essential.

We are partic

ularly concerned that the framework of the Acts
concerning a cause of action is inappropriate with
respect to published forecasts.
#

#

#

#

#

